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124 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tive bargaining agreement is not a defense to a charge of unfair labor
practices, where in the absence of the "hot cargo" provision, the union
conduct would unquestionably be a violation. Thus, inducement of em-
ployees which is prohibited under Section 8(b)(4)(a) in the absence of
a "hot cargo" provision, is likewise prohibited when there is such a pro-
vision.7
From the foregoing cases, a gradual evolution of the definitive meaning
of Section 8 (b) (4) (a) is seen. In the Conway case, it was felt that "hot
cargo" contracts were fully within the law and were to be honored. The
McAllister decision represented a complete reversal calling for an over-
ruling of the Conway case and a declaration that a "hot cargo" provision
is not a defense to a charge under Section 8 (b) (4) (a). In the Sand Door
case, the Board changed its mind again by declaring the contract to be
lawful, and only the appeal to employees unlawful.
Finally, the Supreme Court decided in affirmation of the Sand Door
case that any appeal to the employees is a violation of Section 8 (b) (4)
(a).
In addition, it held that, in spite of a contract, the employer is always
free to make his own choice of dealing with, or refusing to deal with
another concern at the time the question of boycott arises, thus giving
the contract an almost nugatory effect.
7 Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 78 S.Ct. 1011 (1958).
LEGAL ETHICS-OPERATIONS OF UNION LEGAL
AID DEPARTMENT HELD ILLEGAL
AND UNPROFESSIONAL
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and their regional counsel
entered into an agreement whereby fees for claims, arising out of injuries
to employees sustained in railroad accidents, were set at a fixed percent-
age, and any investigation costs, expert witness fees, medical examinations,
transcript costs, and printing of appellate briefs, and department's oper-
ating costs were to be paid by the attorney out of the fixed percentage.'
The investigation costs included a payment to an agent appointed by the
union, whose responsibility it was to complete accident reports on all
injuries occurring to employees in the course of employment. It was the
agent's duty to contact the injured party, or his family, promulgating the
1 Motivated by unhealthy conditions arising from economic pressure being exerted by
some railroad claim-settlement agents, and the incompetency or exorbitant fees of
some lawyers, in 1930 the Brotherhood established the department which, in essence, is
the issue in this case. The avowed purpose of the department is to aid the injured rail-
road employees and their families. The department consisted of sixteen lawyers selected
on a basis of their ability to adequately handle the nature of the cases generally involved
and their ability to procure large settlements in personal injury cases.
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availability of free legal advice. Proceedings were brought to determine
whether this activity was unprofessional and illegal. In re Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, 13 111. 2d 391, 150 N.E. 2d 163 '(1958).
The Supreme Court of Illinois in deciding this problem, considered
particularly, three separate arguments on which the Brotherhood tried
to justify such activities.
First, the Brotherhood attempted to justify the practices in question
under the Railway Labor Act.2 They contended that this federal statute
protects and further condones their activity. The act permits the Brother-
hood to represent its members before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, or other appropriate tribunals, in the processing of disputes grow-
ing out of grievances. The court in refuting this argument stated that the
handling of personal injury cases would not fall within the ambit of the
term "disputes," as said term was intended to be interpreted by the
statute. Further, the court held that the Act was not intended to encroach
upon the state's power to regulate the legal profession. Until the instant
case this precise issue was not decided by a major court.3
Secondly, the Brotherhood asserted, by way of analogy, that, by vir-
tue of their interest in the case, their rights should be considered as tanta-
mount to those of insurance companies.4 Acknowledging an interest
possessed by the Brotherhood, the court distinguishes between the nature
of said interest and that of an insurer. The insurance companies stand to
lose and not to gain by litigation; they are dealing with their own money.
Such is not the situation with the Brotherhood. The court concluded that
the nature of the Brotherhood's interest ". . . does not authorize it to
engage in the active solicitation of those claims for particular lawyers who
finance the solicitation."5 Once again this was the first time a major court
considered this particular issue.
Thirdly, the Brotherhood attempted to justify its activities on the "pub-
lic policy" argument, e.g., that the injured has a right to competent legal
advice. The court acknowledged this argument as having some weight
but not of a sufficient magnitude ". . . to override the principles that must
govern the members of the legal profession in their relations with clients."6
245 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152 (1943).
3 Although this precise issue was not discussed in the opinions, both Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (C.A. 10th, 1956) and In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465(E.D.N.Y., 1933) arrived at the same decision under similar facts.
41. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 32, § 415 states an exception to the law prohibiting a corpo-
ration from practicing law if it ". . . may be interested by reason of the issuance of any
policy or undertaking of insurance, guarantee or indemnity .... "
5 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 395, 150 N.E.2d 163, 166
(1958).
6 bid., at 396, 167.
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The court, in the instant case, was confronted with an earlier Illinois
decision, Ryan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 7 A chronological history of
this case and the law pertaining, thereto should serve to resolve any cur-
rent misunderstanding.
Ryan was an attorney for the Brotherhood who initiated an action
against the railroad to assert a lien claimed as a result of professional serv-
ices rendered to an injured employee. Subsequent to the employee con-
tracting (a Brotherhood Legal Aid Department contract) with Ryan, the
railroad and the employee reached a settlement independent of Ryan. The
railroad defended on the ground that the contract between Ryan and the
employee was the result of solicitation and based upon a "fee-splitting"
arrangement, thus not enforceable.8 The court, after reviewing the nature
of the Brotherhood's Legal Aid Department, upheld the lien. This de-
cision was the genesis of the "public policy" argument. In essence, the
court justified its decision because, ". . . the purpose of the Brotherhood
is a worthy one . . ."I' Although this case was not accepted by other
courts, it had not been expressly overruled by an Illinois Court.
In considering the Ryan decision, the court in the instant case acknowl-
edged the similarity of the issues involved but resorted to a recent Illinois
statute10 (passed while this matter was pending) which clearly "... ex-
pressed a policy contrary to that stated in the Ryan case.""
.There have been other cases opposing the operations of the Brother-
hood's Legal Aid Department 12 but the rationale of those decisions was
based upon the nature of the "fee-splitting" contract as it first existed-
a contract (or eventually two separate contracts) calling for the payment
of a specific percentage of the amount obtained to the attorneys and a
specified percenage of the amount to the Brotherhood. The California
Supreme Court, in Hildebrand v. State Bar,13 appears to draw a distinction
between the effect of having a specific "split-fee" contract and the subse-
quent straight twenty-five per cent arrangement (the lawyer in that case
7 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 13, S 17.
9 268 Ill. App. 364, 379 (1932).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 13, S 15 which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
not an attorney at law to solicit for money, fee, commission, or other remuneration
directly or indirecdy in any manner whatsoever, any demand or claim for personal in-
juries or for death for the purpose of having an action brought thereon, or for the
purpose of settling the same."
"1 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 111. 2d 391, 397, 150 N.E. 2d 163, 167
(1958).
12In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y., 1933); Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
13 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
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having operated under both arrangements). In finding an unprofessional
and illegal practice the court stated, "... petitioners must be held account-
able for the practices which existed during the period that they were
charged with misconduct. '14 This statement appears to have reference to
the period in which the attorney operated under the "fee-splitting" con-
tracts.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the instant case, concluded that the
legitimate interest of the Brotherhood does justify the conducting of in-
vestigations, and a staff, financed by the Brotherhood, may be maintained
to accomplish this purpose. The investigations may be conducted with a
view towards subsequent litigation, but the resulting reports must be
given to the injured or his kin.
Further, the court asserted that the Brotherhood may make known to
all its members, and specifically to those injured, the advisability of ob-
taining legal advice prior to a settlement and the names of attorneys who,
in the opinion of the Brotherhood, can handle such claims successfully.
However, the court also held that the Brotherhood may not permit inves-
tigators to carry the attorneys' contracts or photostats of prior settlement
checks, fix the fees of the attorneys, or maintain any financial connection
with the attorneys.
The Illinois Supreme Court did not take disciplinary action against the
attorneys of the Brotherhood 15 because of the ambiguity resulting from
the Ryan case.' 6 Upon the same basis, the Brotherhood was given until
July 1, 1959 to reorganize in accordance with the recommendations set
forth in the opinion.
14 Ibid., at 514, 514.
15 Ibid. The California court did not take disciplinary action against Hildebrand.
16 The rationale for refusing to discipline was based on In re Luster, 12 IU1.2d 25,
145 NE.2d 75 (1957), where the court permitted an attorney to use as an equitable
defense his reliance on an unreported case never expressly overruled, notwithstanding
similar contra opinions.
NEGLIGENCE-INSURER HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT IS-
SUANCE OF POLICY TO ONE WITH NO INSURABLE IN-
TEREST WHO SUBSEQUENTLY MURDERED INSURED
Appellee, father of a deceased minor child, sued appellants, Liberty
National Life Ins. Co., National Life and Accident Ins. Co., and Southern
Life and Health Ins. Co., for the wrongful death of the child. The father
based his suit upon the theory that the insurers were negligent in issuing
policies of life insurance to the beneficiary, an aunt-in-law, who was
subsequently convicted of the murder of the child. The Supreme Court
of Alabama upheld the judgment of $75,000 on the ground that the evi-
